In the context of e-commerce consumers can exchange privacy information for personalized services of enterprises but thephenomenon of providing false information is also widespread due to concerns about privacy breaches. This paper constructs a relevantgame model to study the choices of consumers’ false information disclosure strategy and its impact on enterprises’ personalized servicelevel and profits of businesses under two situations complete market coverage and incomplete market coverage. The research resultsindicate that in the case of complete market coverage consumers can indifferently choose whether to provide false information and thepresence of false information will inhibit the investment in personalized services by businesses. When the return on investment for personalizedservices is relatively low the existence of false information can enhance business profits. In the case of incomplete marketcoverage when the return rate of personalized services or the marginal cost of disclosing false information is low consumers will disclosefalse information and the number of consumers entering the market will increase accordingly. When the return rate of personalizedservices is high businesses will reduce their investment in services. When the return rate of personalized services is low and themarginal cost of consumers providing false information is high the presence of false information can instead increase business profits.The results not only expand the theory of consumer privacy information protection and application but also provide a certain referencefor e-commerce enterprises on how to encourage the disclosure of privacy information in the case of consumer self-privacy protection.