Based on the research background of “revitalization of talents” in rural revitalization strategy, this paper puts forward the theoretical method of evolutionary game regarding the fact that the cooperation between rural talents and local governments is not coordinated enough during the process of rural revitalization. The paper analyzes the evolution path of cooperation between both sides in different situations by establishing an evolutionary game model of “rural talents and local governments”. The results show that the final evolution results of both sides of the game are related to the initial cooperation intention, input cost and coefficient of income distribution. Increasing the initial cooperation intention value, reducing the input cost and formulating the coefficient of income distribution properly can help both sides reach cooperation. Therefore, this paper puts forward some suggestions on countermeasures for grassroots governments and rural talents: increasing government subsidies for the building of rural grassroots units, establishing sophisticated grassroots management system, improving participation of rural talents and innovating the selection mechanism and participation mode of rural talents.